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Disgust? 
Jamie Redman 
Abstract 
The benefit sanction is a dominant activation policy in Britain's 'welfare-to-work' 
regime. Whilst policymakers believe in their necessity to correct behaviour, research 
shows benefit sanctions cause additional harm to Britain's marginalised groups. 
Drawing upon a small-scale qualitative study, this article first navigates new territory, 
mapping the ways stigma emerges from the state—channelled through the benefit 
sanction—and manifests in the lives of sanctioned claimants. Acknowledging wider 
evidence, the sanction is then argued to have failed as a correctional device. Rather, 
taking into account Britain's current politico-economic climate, the sanction appears as 
a weapon used to incite negative emotion in an attempt to police the boundaries of the 
labour market, whilst frequently abandoning some of the UK's most vulnerable citizens.  
key words:  stigma - benefit sanctions - punishment - welfare reform - economic 
citizenship 
Introduction 
Since the Thatcher administrations, UK welfare reform has increasingly shifted towards 
a communitarian ethos of economic 'rights' conditional upon behavioural 
'responsibilities'. The departure from Beveridgean 'cradle-to-grave' social security has 
been justified on paternalistic grounds, claiming that the unemployed require work-
related obligations and negative incentives in order to change their behaviour and help 
them make rewarding choices in the labour market (Mead, 1992).  Policymakers have 
sought to facilitate behavioural change through binding the state and the claimant in a 
welfare contract, re-designing the benefit sanction to make certain that failure to meet 
behavioural 'responsibilities' will result in the termination of economic 'rights' (Watts 
et al., 2014). The current orthodoxy is that benefit sanctions are a compulsory negative 
incentive for encouraging competence amongst those seeking employment (Gregg, 
2008). However, a growing body of research has shown that fiscal sanctions have been 
ineffective at changing claimant behaviour, instead causing further injury to some of the 
most marginalised groups in Britain (Batty et al., 2015). 
This article first seeks to address an important empirical and theoretical gap. In 
literature on the welfare state, there has been a regular scholarly tradition examining 
the presence of stigma within the experiences of those claiming fiscal benefits 
(Baumberg, 2016).  Similarly, there is research highlighting the 'hidden "costs" of social 
stigma and shame' that accompany alternative social benefits, such as food aid 
(Garthwaite, 2016:280). Moreover, there is now also a growing body of research 
examining the impacts of new behavioural change apparatus, including benefit 
sanctions, on the experiences of claimants (see 
http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/). Hitherto, however, there has not been an in-
depth empirical or theoretical exposition considering the presence of stigma within the 
experience of fiscal benefit loss (via sanction). Exposing this will form the findings 
section(s) of this article. 
Leading on from this, the article then draws upon a wider evidence base to interrogate 
the intentionality of the benefit sanction. Contrary to the objective stated by 
policymakers, it is argued here that the benefit sanction has not helped the unemployed 
make positive, rewarding choices. Rather, when situating sanctioned claimants' 
experiences within Britain's current politico-economic context, the sanction appears 
more accurately as a weapon used against the unemployed as a method of ensuring 
'business confidence' (Block, 1977:16) and preserving capital accumulation in a period 
characterised by low-paying, poor quality and insecure forms of wage labour (Shildrick 
et al., 2012). This is, in part, achieved by imposing various modes of negative emotional 
coercion in effort to '(re)sacralise labour and elevate it to the rank of absolute civic 
duty' (Wacquant, 2009:101). Whilst, in some instances, ostracising those possessing 
circumstances or demonstrating behaviours which were not of immediate value to 
capital (c.f. Reeve, 2017; Grover, 2018:12-14). 
Policy Context 
As a proponent of 'underclass' theory and maintaining that a 'culture of poverty' is rife 
in the US and the UK (see MacDonald and Marsh, 2005:6-8), Lawrence Mead (1992) has 
been highly influential in the justification and implementation of welfare-to-work 
apparatus. Mead was particularly concerned with the permissive nature of benefit 
entitlements, and has since remained devoted to the idea that benefit entitlements 
should be designed so as to target and alter claimant behaviour. He believed the lack of 
work-related obligations surrounding benefit receipt had nurtured behavioural 
dysfunction by, in effect, allowing the poor to eschew discipline imposed through wage 
labour. As such, the poor were seen to have developed antipathy towards the prospect 
of working, which in turn fuelled an entitlement mentality and the simultaneous 
cultivation of welfare dependency (Fletcher and Flint, 2018).  
The dominance of dependency thesis has been observable within the design of British 
social security since the eighties, as policymakers sought to develop a new paternalist 
armature of 'welfare-to-work' apparatus (Adler, 2018). It was in this decade where 
welfare contractualism, that is, the attachment of behavioural conditions 
('responsibilities') to citizenship entitlements ('rights'), had begun to emerge as a new 
policy direction (Crisp and Powell, 2017). More recently, the Coalition government has 
made use of 'dependency' rhetoric to legitimise the routine intensification of conditional 
apparatus enforcing the welfare contract: 
"In a tragic loss of human potential, as individuals and families remained 
trapped in a cruel state of dependency … we now ensure that when someone 
falls unemployed they sign a document called the ‘claimant commitment.’ 
This is a form of contract with the hard working British taxpayers who fund 
these benefits … failure to meet their commitments it says will lead to the 
loss of benefits … 'you are now in work to find work'" (Duncan-Smith, 2014) 
The foremost policy upholding this contract between claimant, 'hard working British 
taxpayers' and the state has been the benefit sanction. And with the agenda set out by 
successive Coalition and Conservative governments, as seen in the excerpt above, both 
the severity and usage of benefit sanctions have intensified over the last five years or so. 
In 2012, the Coalition introduced the enhanced sanctioning regime: 
Table 1: Enhanced Sanctioning Regime for Jobseekers Since 2012 
 
Sanction Level Description 1st Offence 2nd Offence 3rd Offence  
High Fail to comply 
with certain 
requirements 
13 weeks 26 weeks (if 
committed 
after two 
weeks of prior 
Sanction and 
within a year) 
156 weeks (if 
committed 
after two 
weeks of prior 
Sanction and 
within a year) 
Intermediate Fail to actively 
seek work or be 
available for job 
opportunities 
Possible 4 
week sanction 
Possible 13 week sanction (if 
committed after two weeks of 
prior Sanction and within a 
year) 
Low Failure to attend 
or actively 
participate in 
work advisor 
interview or 
employment 
support service 
4 weeks 13 weeks(if committed after 
two weeks of prior Sanction 
and within a year) 
 
Source adapted from: Fletcher and Wright (2018) 
The current trajectory of the sanctioning regime has seen a radical departure from its 
origins in the early 20th century; being increasingly used to target a wider range of 
actions and behaviours deemed uncompliant and/or incompatible with the prospect of 
labour market participation (Adler, 2018). When unemployment insurance was initially 
introduced in 1911, the maximum duration of benefit loss was six weeks (Webster, 
2014). This remained until 1986 when it became 13 weeks, before being rapidly 
escalated to 26 weeks in 1988. By 2012, the Coalition had expanded the timescale of 
benefit loss to three years (Webster, 2014). Alongside increasing severity, the turn of 
century also heralded an aggregate surge in their implementation. Over a million 
sanctions were administered in 2013, rising approximately 245% above their 2001 
level (Dwyer, 2018:148). From 2012-2017, JSA (Jobseekers Allowance) claimants have 
received the most sanctions; with the vast majority either under four weeks (66%) or 
between five and 13 weeks (32%) (DWP, 2017:12). Reasons for JSA sanctions 
correspond with these statistics as lower to intermediate reasons, such as failure to 
actively seek work or attend appointments, comprise the majority of cases (Adler, 
2018:55). Within the demographic of sanctioned claimants, it has been young claimants 
(18-24), as well as disadvantaged populations, which appear to have borne much of the 
brunt. In recent years, young people accounted 'for just over a quarter of the claimant 
count but almost two-fifths of all sanctions' (Crisp and Powell, 2017:1798), while 
homelessness, drug/alcohol or mental health issues have all been found to significantly 
increase the likelihood of receiving a sanction (Batty et al., 2015). Though more recent 
evidence concludes that a 'decision by ministers to ease off' has effectuated significant 
decreases in overall referral rates (Webster, 2016:10), taken in context, Britain is still 
enacting the most punitive sanctioning regime in its history (Adler, 2018). 
From Relational Stigma to Stigma From Above: Welfare-to-
Work Stigmacraft 
As Erving Goffman (1963) himself noted, the presence of stigma has long preceded late 
modern societies and was initially a term used to describe the archaic practice of 
corporeally branding those deemed inferior or amoral. Despite awareness of stigma as a 
social phenomenon it wasn’t until the 20th century that it became of interest to 
sociology, in the form of Goffman's own cogitations on spoiled identity. Goffman's 
(1963) theoretical exposition understood stigma as both the possession of an 
undesirable attribute and the relational process through which others perceive and 
condemn this attribute. In particular, Goffman (1963:14) demonstrates how 'blemishes 
of individual character' can serve to cast the 'discredited' apart from the 'normals'. This 
not only disqualifies the discredited from full social acceptance but, in some instances, 
encourages such individuals to respond by manipulating and regulating information 
passed during social interaction in effort to manage perceived undesirability (Goffman, 
1959). This aspect of Goffman's analysis remains pertinent for understanding the 
current political climate in Britain, where out-of-work status is equated to behavioural 
iniquity and stands contrariwise to the moral rectitude located in the performance of 
exploitative wage labour (see Weeks, 2011:37-77). 
In spite of Goffman's enduring relevance, contemporary academics have expressed 
dissatisfaction with his original theorisation and have since approached stigma from 
alternative directions. The more recent orthodoxy amongst theorists has been to view 
stigma as 'a form of governmentality', that is, a phenomenon customarily emerging from 
above and deployed in effort to establish social control (Tyler and Slater, 2018:729). In 
particular, Tyler (2013) has argued stigma to be an important tool for the preservation 
and advancement of neoliberal political agenda. More precisely, stigma has been used to 
acquire public support for an array of punitive policies directed at the unemployed. 
Tyler (2013) describes this process as a form of 'social abjection'. Taken on its own, 
'abjection' is defined as either an act of abasement or the condition of being degraded. 
Social abjection, however, is both a socially binding and socially excluding force which 
fosters cohesion between the electorate and state agenda through the reconfiguration of 
particular societal groups as something to be regarded with disgust. Social abjection has 
been argued as an underlying causation behind the ascendancy of anti-welfare 
commonsense amongst the British citizenry (Jensen and Tyler, 2015); wherein a 
sustained offensive portraying claiming as an abject lifestyle choice courtesy of the 
taxpayer has been perpetuated in effort deprecate unemployed life as a failure of the 
welfare state. The broader purpose of this has been to elicit legitimate feelings of 
outrage amongst the working populace, so as to rally support for elite policymakers and 
their agenda to correct perverse welfare behaviour(s) via the intensification of neo-
liberal self-responsibilisation strategies (c.f. Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013:297). 
Synergetic with theory of social abjection, Scambler's (2018) recent exposition shows 
how stigma is not simply a marker of shame, but a weapon used to impute blame and 
harnessed to meet the interests of the capitalist class. Scambler traces the 
weaponisation of stigma back to the Thatcherite fiscal and social policies which 
presaged both the explosion of financial capitalism and, along with it, the restoration of 
capital's omnipotence (Harvey, 2007). However, Scambler (2018:768) argues capital's 
return to supremacy not only entailed dominance over the working class, but also 'over 
the decisions and activities of the power elite at the apex of the state apparatus'. More 
precisely, fresh exposure to the world marketplace and increasing economic 
dependence on internationally mobile capital has been argued to render political elites 
increasingly subordinate to 'business confidence' and the preservation of untrammelled 
capital accumulation (Block, 1977:16; Crouch, 2004). As such, welfare-to-work 
employment services have been residualised (Fletcher and Wright, 2018) and re-
designed to 'erode labour power autonomy' (Wiggan, 2015:372) as well as shaming 
actions and behaviours deemed unconducive to the sale of labour power. This is, in part, 
evidenced by Walker's (and others) transnational research on the relationship between 
poverty and shame. Walker (2014) uses the term 'stigmatisation' to describe shaming 
that is sponsored by the state and institutionally embedded within the 'framing, 
structure and delivery of welfare benefits' (Walker and Chase, 2014:11). In the UK, 
many studies have documented the institutionalised shame of claiming benefit 
entitlements, ranging invariably from demeaning street-level encounters at the 
Jobcentre (Jeffery, Devine and Thomas, 2018), to the humiliation of means-testing and 
rigid bureaucratic procedures.  From Walker’s (2014) perspective, such procedures can 
often be understood as an intentional effort made by the state to impose forms of 
emotional coercion through policies which induce feelings of shame and thereby 
'motivate' the poor into becoming economically active.  As shall be revealed, in this 
respect, benefit sanctions are no exception to other aspects of the claiming process. 
Methods 
The data presented in this article was drawn from a small scale qualitative study into 
the experiences of young jobseekers in receipt of out-of-work benefits. A purposive 
sampling strategy was deployed to select 20 participants based on their age (18-24) and 
type of benefit received. Participants were recruited through the distribution of leaflets 
and through direct contact by informally approaching service users outside a Jobcentre 
Plus office in one UK city. All participants identified as current or former jobseekers, 
with 17 receiving JSA, two receiving Universal Credit and one recently migrating onto 
Employment Support Allowance. Out of the 20 participants, 12 had received a sanction 
at some stage of their claim although none were undergoing a sanction at the time of the 
study. Among those sanctioned, the sample all identified as White British and was 
heavily skewed towards men (11, and one woman). While one did not reveal his 
housing situation, four were living in accommodation for those with a housing need, and 
the remaining seven were either living with parents or partners. Two had gone on to 
post-16 education, with eleven finding intermittent combinations of warehouse, 
labouring and customer service jobs in between periods of claiming. Claimants were not 
asked to identify their class background, though it might be ascertained from their 
living situation, educational attainment and labour market profile that all participants 
held a working-class position. Sanctioning periods ranged from four weeks to six 
months, though all participants cited low-level reasons for their sanction.  As the study 
was not originally directly focused on experiences of benefit sanctions, participants 
were not selected on the basis of whether they had experienced a sanction in the past, 
though all data presented in this article is derived from claimants who had received a 
sanction at some point in their claim. The sample was also limited in that it only covered 
the experiences of one claimant subgroup (young jobseekers), although this is partially 
offset by evidence revealing that the under-25 claimant group face substantially higher 
risk of being sanctioned (Watts et al., 2014). 
Participants were asked to undertake a 40-minute, semi-structured interview. 
Participants received a £10 gift voucher as a thank you for sharing their experiences. As 
the research was focused on young people and unemployment, the deliberate targeting 
of young benefit claimants was considered ethically justifiable. Good ethical practice 
was adhered to throughout, with emphasis placed on anonymity, confidentiality and 
informed consent. Authorisation for this research was received by the University of 
Amsterdam and conducted in line with the university's ethical protocol.  
Findings: Benefit Sanctions in Everyday Life 
Previous studies have acknowledged how shame is institutionalised and stigma is 
imposed upon the poor, unemployed through the delivery of welfare benefits (Walker, 
2014). However, the present research suggests that this is also visible when observing 
the retraction of welfare benefits via fiscal sanction. This has a number of implications 
for theory which form the structure of this findings section. First, as part of its coercive 
approach to correct behaviour, the benefit sanction reconfigures claimants as 
'undeserving' citizens. Second, loss of benefit entitlement simultaneously levies a fiscal 
toll, forcing some claimants (not all) to embody abjection as a means of survival. 
'Undeserving' Citizens 
Hitherto, the behavioural change function of the benefit sanction is widely understood 
as located in its capacity to remove benefit entitlements. Put simply, the policy hinges 
on the notion that (threat of) destitution will inspire fear and anxiety (see Reeves and 
Loopstra, 2017), which in turn encourages claimants to alter their behaviour and 
conform to expectations set out in the claimant commitment.  In the present study, 
another form of negative emotional coercion was found to accompany benefit loss. 
Benefit sanctions also comprise a set of pejorative inferences which, in turn, enact a 
form of tacit stigmatisation by rubberstamping claimants as undeserving of social 
assistance. This will require a close inspection of evidence. 
During this study, there was a pervasive tendency amongst sanctioned participants to 
ridicule the legitimacy of their penalty and/or vindicate their behaviour. In other words, 
though some claimants accepted they had contravened the rubric of their claim, none 
conceded their loss of entitlement as a consequence of behavioural incompetence. Now 
of course, it is not suggested here that respondents were simply paying lip service and 
all sanctions were legitimately administered on the grounds of incompetence. In fact, 
evidence suggests sanctions can and have been legislated for reasons which have 
nothing to do with claimant misdemeanour (see Soss, Fording and Schram, 2013). It is, 
however, suggested that some claimants made attempts to vindicate their behaviour 
because of what sanctions infer about the moral character of sanctioned claimants. 
Paying close attention to the concluding sentence of the following excerpt, this can be 
detected in Dean's defensive recollection of his benefit loss: 
“So I turned up to Jobcentre, Friday, 20 to three. I was like well I don’t 
see Amy she’s not here so I said to Paul, ‘Paul, why is Amy not here? I’ve 
got an appointment in ten minutes’. And Paul went ‘you don’t’. And it’s 
like well I do, and he said ‘no cause Amy’s not in today. You had an 
appointment yesterday at three o’clock.’ And I went… ‘crap’… It was 
completely legit (legitimate). It wasn’t a case of yeah I was on a piss up 
the night before and I forgot or owt like that it was a genuine thing.” 
(Dean) 
While Dean accepted that he had broken the rules, he remained determined to make it 
known that his sanction was not founded on behavioural incompetence ('on a piss up 
and I forgot or owt like that'), but a genuine mistake. In doing this, it became apparent 
that Dean was concerned the sanction had insinuated something undesirable about his 
character. Thus, when recounting his experience of benefit loss, Dean appeared to 
engage in a form of impression management (Goffman, 1959). He did this by repeatedly 
underscoring the sincerity of his mistake (see excerpt above) in effort to place distance 
between himself and the undesirable inferences accompanying his sanction, ostensibly 
so as to manage the prospect of being maligned or cast apart by others (Goffman, 1963). 
According to Howe (1998:536), impression management is often a daily occurrence for 
the claimant unemployed, as they face a routine struggle to 'get themselves classified as 
deserving' of financial support in the eyes of others. This struggle was noticeably 
pronounced amongst claimants who had received a sanction, many of whom openly 
associated sanctions with 'undeserving' behaviours and were thus careful to manage 
recollections of their own benefit loss. Here, Jack's testimony presents an important 
case. When asked if he had ever received a benefit sanction before, Jack responded: 
"Erm yeah I’ve experienced a sanction before… at the time I had a 
sanction because obviously I was 18 that's when I started the work and 
obviously I tried to play a bit smart and I won't lie because they’ve 
already found me for doing it." (Jack) 
Jack had routinely undertaken temporary/atypical work throughout his working life in 
order to get by. Here, he confessed to 'play[ing] a bit smart' and working extra hours to 
accumulate more cash without informing his work coach. However, as the interview 
progressed, Jack began to repeatedly deny the legitimacy of his sanction—"obviously I 
got done for a little scam but I didn’t know I was scamming"—and eventually became 
resistant: 
“But when they’re getting paid every two weeks some people they’ve 
got problems with drink, they gamble, they smoke cannabis, they’ll take 
bigger drugs so… their allowances to be honest to me I think should get 
sanctioned" … "sanctioning to me is a good thing. But then it’s the 
people that deserve it, it’s a good thing, the people that don’t deserve it 
like me I didn’t really do anything wrong I don’t think.” (Jack) 
From his testimony, it was possible to infer with reasonable certainty that Jack had 
knowingly transgressed the terms of his claim. Despite this, Jack still chose not to 
concede. Rather, as he continued, Jack appeared to demonstrate increasing concern for 
how a valid sanction might be perceived, which outwardly led him to managing his 
recollection. This interpretation is strengthened when applying previous research and 
theory on the various forms of impression management used by claimants to manage 
the undesirability of claimant status. Notably, Patrick (2016) has described claimants as 
employing 'deflection'. That is, to fortify one's own deservingness of benefits by 
censuring some 'other' sharing identical status, yet is in some way conspicuously less 
deserving of support (see also Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013:299-300). Jack can be 
seen using an identical strategy to manage the undesirability of sanctioned status; 
taking measures to ensure he was seen as compliant and thus undeserving of sanction, 
despite his earlier admission, by constructing pejorative judgments upon those 
imagined to possess hedonistic predispositions. Similar to Jack, many other participants 
demonstrated an acute awareness of those behaviours deserving—"if they’re lazy, then 
yeah they do deserve it"—and undeserving of sanction—"obviously people like me who 
are looking for jobs and we get it for no reason, we don’t deserve it" (Karen). The 
consensus was that sanctions were for those claimants demonstrating anti-work and/or 
felonious behaviours that, in effect, remained 'culturally different from workers' (Howe, 
1998:535). Knowledge of this often made it necessary for claimants to establish 
distance and manage the legitimacy of their own sanction, so as to reinforce their own 
deservingness (of support) and, where possible, avoid stigmatisation in the presence of 
others. 
Making Abject Denizens 
While sanctions were often seen as a marker of undeservingness which sometimes 
required forms of management, the loss of stable income also infiltrated claimants' 
private lives, causing additional injury. It is suggested here that the benefit sanction can 
also be realised a brutal modality of social abjection, rendering some individuals 
completely estranged from any structures of formal support. To be sure, social abjection 
can be understood as an exclusive force harnessed and practiced by the state to 
reconfigure particular groups as disgusting (Tyler, 2013). In this study, the benefit 
sanction could be seen as a policy used to the same effect, by transforming claimants 
from citizens to economic denizens. And this process was empirically observable, as 
social abjection is not only enacted (by the state), but 'also experienced and lived by 
those constituted as disgusting in their experiences of displacement and abandon' 
(Tyler, 2013:26). Dave's recollection corroborated this interpretation, who, as a result 
of enduring drug addiction, was often unable to comply with the rubric of his claimant 
commitment. This left him liable for punishment and subsequent fiscal loss meant he 
had little choice but to find alternative means of subsistence: 
“I don’t really have no parents, mums not here she’s up there 
[deceased]. My dad’s in jail, so.  So I had to go out tappin’ (begging). 
Tappin’ out every day… five days a week. Nearly got arrested as well 
like… nearly got fined.” (Dave) 
It is important to note that claimants declaring circumstances similar to Dave's do have 
the opportunity to apply for a 'hardship payment', that is, a reduced-rate payment 
(approx. 60%) sometimes available post-sanction. However, as Adler (2018:79-84) 
states, eligibility is subject to a stringent set of criteria while 'claimants are often not 
told about hardship payments'. In this study, many sanctioned claimants—particularly 
those with drug/alcohol problems and/or learning difficulties—did not convey 
awareness of the hardship payment. Receiving a benefit sanction therefore left many 
(not all) participants with no other choice but to 'become abject' on a routine basis 
(Tyler, 2013). This not only took the form of street begging, but loss of entitlement also 
incurred a retraction of 'housing benefit' (financial support for rented accommodation), 
leaving some completely destitute: 
"He was like ‘aw im sorry for this but… we have to… close your claim’. 
So they sanctioned me… of course because of my learning difficulties 
and they didn’t believe me I had it" …  "Yeah I couldn’t pay the rent 
cause of course my sanction. So of course I lost my accommodation, and 
I went homeless for six months. Yeah I was on the streets for six 
months.” (Seb) 
Again, benefit sanctions should not ordinarily extend to a loss of housing benefit. 
However, the Jobcentre will often contact the council to notify them of a change in 
circumstances, who in turn halt claimants' housing benefit until they are made aware of 
a change in income (Money Advice Service, 2017). Seb was not informed of this 
procedure which, alongside his inability to search for and document job opportunities 
(a mandatory condition of his claim) due to reading and writing difficulties, made him 
homeless. Like others in this study, Seb was left with little other choice but to engage in 
forms of survival crime as well as setting up shelter (tents) in public spaces. Through 
these testimonies, it became possible to observe how the state not only reconfigured 
welfare claimants as abject 'others' through pejorative discourse (Jensen and Tyler, 
2015), but also took measures to ratify this claim by using punitive welfare apparatus as 
a means of forcing claimants into the performance of abject behaviours.  
For some claimants benefit loss was not as devastating, or at least in the material sense. 
Sanctions were often experienced differently depending on claimants' ability to 
mobilise social capital. In particular, for claimants possessing stronger social ties, the 
fiscal dimension of benefit loss was more easily managed. However, abjection still 
pervaded their lives as loss of income imposed new, stigmatising conditions of 
dependency. Notably 'stigmatisation', that is, shame 'backed by the power of the state' 
(Walker 2014:53), can be seen as pervasive among those who had received a sanction: 
 “Well… after when I got sanctioned I didn’t- obviously I didn’t have no 
money to get by or owt so… I kept on asking my mum and people… and 
my friends to sort me out a bit of money to get by… I kind of felt 
ashamed cause… erm obviously I didn’t want to ask ‘em d’ya know 
what I mean? I didn’t wanna ask ‘em to borrow money… because I’ve 
been sanctioned.” (Dillan) 
As Chase and Walker (2013:748) found, the experience of poverty is 'inextricably linked 
to a persistent sense of failure in measuring up to social norms and expectations'. This is 
especially the case in contemporary Britain, 'where success is largely measured 
according to the attainment of economic goals' (Chase and Walker, 2013:740). Benefit 
sanctions appeared to compound this sense of failure for young claimants in poverty, 
resulting in renewed feelings of shame. As Dillan's testimony reveals, his sanction 
resulted, for a time at least, in him being unable to live independently from the fiscal 
support of family and friends—a customary expectation placed on young adults. The 
difficulty of this situation was also described by Jack, as economic independence 
appeared to be a source of masculine pride: 
“It’s just I feel guilty cause I see it as like I shouldn’t borrow money off 
family members… especially like my Mum and Dad cause they had me 
for that long and they’ve spent that much to provide for my life… I 
should have been the man I should have been and stood up” (Jack) 
Jack expressed 'guilt', an emotional cognate of shame (Chase and Walker, 2013), to 
describe feelings surrounding benefit loss. Throughout the interview, Jack appeared to 
embody the values of traditional working class masculinity, which was no less reflected 
in his predilection for manual forms of labour (Nixon, 2009). In deindustrialised Britain, 
demand for Jack's skill set has been in consistent decline in place of a growing service 
economy (Nixon, 2009). As previously touched upon, in order to get by, Jack would 
combine sporadic agency work with benefit entitlements to maintain economic 
independence and reaffirm his masculinity. Losing regular income appeared to strip 
him of both his independence and pride, producing feelings of guilt and emasculation. 
Analogous to the experiences of other participants in this study, it can be seen how Jack 
had to manage a range of negative emotions that resulted from receiving a benefit 
sanction. 
Discussion: Are Sanctions in the Interests of their Recipients? 
Despite elite policymakers' cognisance around some of the hardships detailed above 
they remain committed to sanctions; viewing them as both effective and necessary on 
the grounds that (threat of) benefit loss fosters more intensive engagement with the 
labour market, prevents fraudulent activity and ensures a work-ethic that is amenable 
to the prospect of wage labour. Based on this, sanctions have been marketed to the 
electorate as serving the interests of the unemployed working class, helping them to 
'focus and get on' with making positive choices that will ultimately benefit them in the 
long run (Duncan-Smith, 2016). Keeping this in mind, the commencing section will 
briefly examine the evidence surrounding benefit sanctions, questioning whether they 
truly serve working class interests. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence favouring sanctioning regimes has come from outside 
the UK, with a number of studies across Europe finding those experiencing benefit loss 
as both more likely to find work and making faster re-entries into the labour market 
(Boockmann, Thomsen and Walter, 2014). Yet, the same body of research also reported 
detrimental transition effects, as sanctions encouraged individuals to accept lower pay 
than previous occupations and new tenures were sometimes short-lived (Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 2016:40). In the UK, sanctioning effects on labour market re-entry 
have been described as a 'phenomenal success', so much so that Britain is now 'running 
out of people to go back into work' (Duncan-Smith, 2016). However, the existing data 
appears less convincing. Loopstra et al.'s (2015) analysis of aggregate data sets revealed 
only 7.4 claimants move into work per every 100 adverse sanctions over a two-month 
period, while qualitative data has shown how those that do enter work post-sanction 
are sometimes exposed to highly exploitative employment relationships (Briken and 
Taylor, 2018:449-451). Briken and Taylor demonstrate how sanctions can, particularly 
in slack regional labour markets, allow employers to increase the rate of exploitation 
over their workforce by prohibiting refusal and forcing unemployed individuals to 
accept atypical working conditions facilitated through temporary work agencies. These 
findings are indistinguishable from the present study, with the only participant 
reporting work post-sanction (Elliot) undertaking a temporary role as a warehouse 
‘picker-packer’. Without discussion or review, Elliot was immediately dismissed shortly 
after starting—because "your speed has to be at 90 per cent or over and [he] got 89.7". 
And although Elliot seemed to accept this with docility, perhaps even viewing short 
tenure and immediate dismissal as the norm, taking the job appeared to have made him 
worse off in the long-term. In the weeks after, the rigmarole of re-applying for JSA 
meant he had to endure a substantial period of time without any income. 
Irrespective of the questionable effects on labour market participation, sanctions are 
still considered necessary to ensure the unemployed possess a suitable work ethic 
(Mead, 1992). As regards evidence supporting this, Dunn's (2014) investigation of 
voluntary unemployment presents important findings. Resulting from his 
dissatisfaction with the 'left-of-centre' political bias embedded within social policy 
research (51-54), Dunn set out to design a project with 'neglected conservative 
arguments in mind' (6) by focusing on claimants' labour market behaviour. Despite 
arriving from this position, claimants were still found to possess identical proclivities to 
the bulk of the working populace. In other words, claimants possessed a strong desire to 
work and held preferences about what kinds of jobs they would feasibly undertake. 
Moreover, Dunn found no evidence of welfare dependency (191-193), instead 
acknowledging that 'unemployment is best understood as largely a structural problem' 
(189). Thus, despite Dunn having 'fewer qualms than some commentators about 
imposing severe benefit sanctions' (194), his findings largely controvert their policy 
rationale and instead reinforce evidence already collected by those 'quasi-titmuss' 
social policy authors he so vehemently contends.  
Despite rates of benefit fraud remaining consistently around 1% of total expenditure 
(DWP, 2018), sanctions have also been argued as necessary to prevent abuses of the 
system (DWP, 2011). Ordinarily, or among conservative commentators at least, fraud is 
attributed to a 'repertoire of scrounging skills' developed by the unemployed in pursuit 
of 'a life of future idleness' (Marsland, 1996: 112; see also 123-124). Yet in this study, 
the only case of fraud (see findings section above) appeared intriguingly as antithetical 
to such claim (c.f. MacDonald, 1994). In other words, Jack's transgression did not arrive 
from lack of work ethic: "It’s like with the agencies you have to go in there a bit 
aggressive and be like I want work today...And if they don’t put me down then I’m gonna 
make a complaint". Rather, Jack's case appeared more accurately as a 'survival strategy' 
(MacDonald, 1994:520); an underhand attempt to retain stable income and/or 
accumulate more cash in effort to satisfy consumptive needs/desires whilst locked in a 
cycle of low-paying and precarious job opportunities. Therefore, contrary to pejorative 
'scrounger' narratives, this for the most part kept him aligned with the 'dominant value 
system' of the worker-consumer populace (Dean and Melrose, 1997:116). Taking this 
into account, Jack's transgression should neither be played down nor ignored, but 
acknowledged equally as an indictment of an 'opportunity' structure which ostensibly 
precluded him from accessing more permanent, better paid work (see Shildrick et al., 
2012). 
The evidence and argumentation in favour of sanctioning presented hitherto should 
also be considered against a growing body of research documenting the many hardships 
accompanying benefit loss (Adler, 2018). A recently concluded five-year Welfare 
Conditionality project found sanctions to initiate and sustain a range of negative 
behaviour changes, ranging from mental health impairments to 'begging, borrowing and 
stealing' (Dwyer, 2018:150-154: see also Batty et al., 2015:vi). Sanctions have been 
found as encouraging some claimants to disengage with employment and support 
altogether; further compounding a range of vulnerabilities and ultimately reducing 
individuals' chances of finding work in the future (Dwyer, 2018). This is supported by 
quantitative evidence, as Loopstra et al. (2015) found claimants several times more 
likely to drop out into 'unknown destinations' rather than enter formal work after 
receiving a sanction. Whilst Grover (2018:12) demonstrates how those unwilling or 
unable to sell their labour power are vulnerable to 'social murder', as mechanisms such 
as sanctions have been found to incur deaths related to penury. 
Taking the balance of evidence into account, it remains difficult to see how benefit 
sanctions serve the interests of the unemployed. In other words, there is scant UK-based 
evidence to support the claim that sanctions support faster labour market entry, let 
alone help people make positive, rewarding choices. Acknowledging this, then, it seems 
important to question precisely whose interests are sustained and/or progressed via 
the current regime. One interpretation can be provided by situating experiences of 
sanctions within Britain's wider politico-economic context. This will be briefly 
considered here. 
The last forty years have seen new pressures incurred by economic globalisation 
encourage political elites to become increasingly sensitive to 'business confidence', that 
is, 'the capitalist's general evaluation of the political/economic climate' (Block, 1977:16). 
For the state, attempting to satisfy business confidence has entailed creating an 
economic climate favourable to profitable investment (Harvey, 2007), whilst taking 
measures to ensure the 'working class are under control' (Block, 1977:16) and available 
as a compliant and economically useful pool of labour power (Umney, 2018). This has 
not only taken shape through privatisation, tax breaks and dismantling key labour 
market institutions (such as welfare) in efforts to drive down wages and reduce 
impingements on profit-making potential (Glyn, 2006). But also in designing new 
methods of ensuring the unemployed fractions of the working class are either made 
valuable to capital, or otherwise exposed 'to a material and symbolic degradation worse 
than the most demeaning jobs' (Wacquant, 2009:108)—and the role of the benefit 
sanction in this endeavour should not be underestimated.  
As a policy of labour market discipline, the benefit sanction can be seen to inflict 
material and emotional harms in efforts to control unemployed labour power. This has 
been found as claimants not only experienced material harms resultant of fiscal loss 
(Batty et al., 2015), but also emotional harms emerging in multiplicities of fear and 
anxiety (Reeves and Loopstra, 2017), anger and frustration (Fletcher and Flint, 2018), 
as well as stigma and shame (see above). Given these harms have been found as 
overwhelmingly ineffective in enabling claimants to make positive, rewarding choices in 
the labour market (Dwyer, 2018), such phenomena can be interpreted as part of a wider 
strategy to ensure 'business confidence'. This is because, on the one hand, harms 
imposed via sanctions directly benefitted capital, subordinating claimants to 
exploitative employment relationships (Briken and Taylor, 2018). Whilst on the other 
hand, sanctions have been found to reduce aggregate caseloads (Watts et al., 2014) by, 
in part at least, ostracising claimants for behaviours (e.g. poor time keeping) which did 
not reflect the discipline often required to perform wage labour. The latter is 
strengthened by evidence which has found those more likely to receive a sanction as 
synonymously those experiencing drug, health and/or competency problems (Batty et 
al., 2015). Put another way, penalised individuals were more often those unable to 
demonstrate the necessary behaviours and competences (e.g good time keeping/basic 
reading and writing skills) commonly required to participate in the labour market. 
Taking this in context, the usage of benefit sanctions over such individuals appeared to 
reflect a disavowal of commitment towards many of those possessing behaviours 
and/or circumstances which weren't readily exploitable under a wage relation. As such, 
albeit only temporarily in the instances of this study, the benefit sanction became a 
useful tool for alleviating fiscal claims made by those often perceived as 'fit-to-work' (c.f. 
Loopstra et al., 2015), yet were in some way unlikely to be of immediate value to capital 
(see Reeve, 2017; Grover, 2018). This was not only done by forcing such claimants into 
abject dependency upon members of the citizenry through begging and borrowing, but 
also by forcing others to take out loans and thereby creating a consumer base for pay-
day loan capitalists.  
Thus, when considering the existing UK evidence base and situating experiences of 
sanctions within Britain's current politico-economic context, the benefit sanction 
appears more accurately as a weapon used against the unemployed. Failing to promote 
positive and rewarding choice-making, the benefit sanction is widely evidenced to inflict 
an array of harms via the punishment and, in some cases, abandonment, of those 
unwilling, or unable, to exhibit behavioural deference to a state possessing only 'one 
true and fundamental social policy: economic growth’ (Foucault, 2008:144). 
 
Conclusion 
Briefly recapping, the first objective of this article was to reveal how stigma and shame 
are channelled through benefit sanctions. Here, sanctions were found to impose 
stigmatisation by marking claimants out as behaviourally incompetent and hence 
'undeserving' of social assistance, while shame arose in the measures some were 
required to take in order to cope with benefit loss. An important limitation of these 
findings, however, should be acknowledged here. The sample was restricted to young 
people and, in particular, young men. Whilst this sub-group are among the most likely to 
receive sanctions, it would be more than plausible to imagine that the emotional 
impacts of benefit loss manifest in different ways and to differing extents for other sub-
groups. This might warrant further investigation, although any scholarly interest in 
such an endeavour should first consult the already comprehensive (and still pending) 
output of the Welfare Conditionality project.  
The second objective was to question the intentionality of the benefit sanction. Though 
policymakers argue that sanctions encourage the unemployed to make positive labour 
market choices, a growing body of evidence has exposed this as a fallacy. As such, 
especially given the range of harms known to accompany a sanction, it remains difficult 
at first glance to see how this policy meets its professed objective as a 'correctional 
device'. There is, however, a final point to consider here. Although sanctions fail to 
'correct' behaviour in the fashion publicly described by policymakers, this isn't 
necessarily a view shared, perhaps tacitly, by those with vested interests in managing 
the economy or purchasing labour power. Over the years, tougher welfare-to-work 
regimes have proven successful in forcing large volumes of people off welfare and, 
albeit slightly less successfully, into low-paid work (Peck, 2001:283). Therefore, the 
extent to which one views the efficacy of benefit sanctions might only be a matter of 
perspective. For some political and economic elites, the benefit sanction could well have 
succeeded in correcting claimant behaviour; or at least insofar as it fosters more 
intensive engagement with an increasingly derisory pool of job 'opportunities' while, in 
unison, keeping overall claims made on the state to a minimum. This is not, however, a 
view that should be shared by those loyal to evidence-based research and/or those with 
an impenitent interest in ameliorating social inequities. From this perspective, the 
benefit sanction has not only been a resounding failure, but one customarily suffered by 
some of the most vulnerable among us. 
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